There's a very interesting article in this morning's New York Times discussing the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the tribal region of Pakistan (Amid Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan). It's a useful story, but also woefully (and intentionally) incomplete. One item that the Times conveniently ignores is that there is a new, US State Department sponsored government in office over there right now. That government will be at odds with any action that we take now in Pakistan.
The article talks of our engagement with Pakistan, and the undisputed fact that Al Qaeda has reconstituted it's forces in the largely ungoverned tribal and northwest regions. It has some very useful information about the disputes within our federal government as to the tactics and strategy we should be using with Pakistan.
But after going through the article, the question most readers will have is "What do we do different now?" That's an interesting question, as the article shows the absolute failure of the Times preferred method of engaging our enemies - diplomacy. The piece attempts to hide this, of course. It lets the State Department entirely off the hook, uses as one of its main sources the man who blew Valerie Plame's cover - Richard Armitage - and criticizes the military because of its reluctance to use force. By doing so, the authors fit themselves neatly into Barack Obama's narrative on the War on Terror.
The article also blames the Iraq War for all of the 'problems' in Pakistan. That's laughable on its face - we have the forces necessary to go after Al Qaeda and Bin Laden in Pakistan, as General Petraeus will show the country after he assumes control of Central Command and begins directing the war in Afghanistan.
What was (and is) wrong in Afghanistan and Pakistan is the same thing that was wrong in Iraq - we had the wrong military and civilian leadership, wedded to their own wrong strategy, in place for far too long. I'm not talking about domestic leadership necessarily, but more about in-theater leadership. After giving a strategy enough time to develop, if leadership sees that the strategy is not working, they are obligated to change it. That doesn't mean that you do what the Democrats want to do - surrender when things get tough. It means that you fight a war like a war, not like a diplomatic exercise.
Looking at the article, the first thing that comes to mind is the crippling effect of the military's bureaucracy. The military must have a free hand in launching operations in-theater, without having to wait hours or days for approval from Washington. Next problem - we have lawyers directing warfare. That must stop, permanently. Use them as advisers, certainly, but make sure that a mission's "go" status is never dependent on an OK from a lawyer.
And last, recognize who your friends are, and who are not. With Pakistan, it's easy. We are allies (more "unfortunate bedfellows") with Pervez Musharraf. We are not allies with a significant portion of his country. The fundamentalist Pakistani public, the Pakistani intelligence services (especially the ISI), US State Department supported political elites, and many in the military are not our friends and are actively working against us. We can draw two conclusions from that upon which we must base our strategy. The first being that joint operations will not work unless you're a fan of fratricide. The second is that when the decision is finally made to clean up (to the extent possible) FATA and NWFP, it will have huge repercussions within Pakistan. Any action is going to involve attacking the territory of a country that we are not currently at war with. We must make certain that Musharraf and his allies are prepared, once again, to take military control of his country in order to prevent it from becoming fully Islamist. We shouldn't fool ourselves - it's not going to be pretty.
One of the few good things Colin Powell did when he was Secretary of State was have his "heart to heart" (or, as reported, his "general to general") talk with Musharraf after 9/11. At that time, Powell indicated to the General that "You're either with us, or against us". Powell's usefulness to winning the War on Terror ended with those words, as he consequently turned into a State Department flunky. Goals should have been established, and we should have informed Pakistan that we reserved the right to take military action against targets within Pakistan if those targets are using Pakistan's territory as a staging ground for attacks against us. Instead, we've allowed Musharraf to do things at his pace, and treated Pakistan as primarily a diplomatic issue.
When we do take action, we are criticized by the same geniuses in the media and on the Left who are now complaining that we aren't doing enough. A prime example of this happened just a few weeks ago, when it was reported in the media that US forces struck and killed 11 Pakistani troops. One problem with that story - there hasn't been any independent confirmation that the wrong people were killed. Sweetness & Light has photos showing those killed, and they don't include any obvious military personnel. Furthermore, the US Military came out and has said that it was a justified attack, even releasing drone videotape showing that there was no military outpost in the area, as was claimed by Pakistan. And what was the Pakistani military doing in an area where terrorists were staging attacks? Certainly not their job - or were they? The absolute lack of any stories on this subject after the initial hand-wringing on June 11th and 12th makes me think that Pakistan, and the media, doth protest too much.
In addition, the dirty little secret behind this NYT article on Pakistan is that the State Department has been undermining Musharraf and pushing for elections in Pakistan for years, instead of insisting on progress against Al Qaeda first. State did this knowing that such elections would result in Musharraf's weakening. The State Department succeeded - they got their elections (getting their favored candidate killed in the process), the new government is extremely anti-US, and Musharraf is a figurehead, no longer even the official head of the military.
So, after years of doing things the NYT's way, the Times is now critical of our efforts in Pakistan - citing lost opportunities. It's true, there were lost opportunities, but it has nothing to with Iraq, as the NYT would lead you to believe. It has to do with clinging to diplomacy even when military strength is called for.
Having the President yell at Musharraf isn't going to solve the problem in Pakistan. Having the President order strikes against the terrorists will.